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When Rodrigo Duterte took office as the President of the Philippines on June 30, 2016, his campaign 
focus on illegal drugs as a national security problem that necessitated an iron-fisted response be-
came government policy. Duterte gave carte blanche to the Philippine National Police (PNP) to kill 
drug pushers and dealers at will as long as they could somehow claim to have been acting in self-de-
fense. Thousands of suspects died at the hand of police officers and vigilantes who understood 
Duterte’s rash rhetoric as an invitation to participate in a state-led, nationwide killing spree. 
However, killings were not uniformly spread across the Philippines, but focused on highly urban-
ized regions and especially the National Capital Region (NCR) and the adjacent regions of Central 
Luzon and CALABARZON (regs. 3 and 4a) as well as the urbanized metropolises of the Visayas and 
Mindanao (Cebu and Davao). It was hardly noticed that there was not only huge variation between 
rural and urban environments, but also within regions consisting of otherwise fairly similar local gov-
ernment units (LGUs). This spatial as well as temporal variation of police use of deadly force within 
the urbanized core of the Philippines was accompanied by huge variation in the related phenomenon 
of vigilante killings. 
These differences in local reaction to a central government policy militate against explanations 
of police violence centering on specifics or deficiencies of police organization, ideology, culture, or 
patterns of policing. Given that the Philippine National Police (PNP) is a national organization with 
uniform training, structure and policy of career advancement, uniformity would be expected rather 
than variation. Structural explanations also fall short, given that many of these urban LGUs are as 
similar as could be expected under real-world conditions. 
In the Philippines, national politics are crucial as an explanation for the campaign in the first 
place: by fiat of the president. This report argues that local politics are crucial as an explanation for 
variations in local implementation of the campaign against illegal drugs. 
The point of departure for the argument is the observance of variation in patterns of local gover-
nance in the field of citizen security that results in either 1) the development of local networks includ-
ing the local branch of the PNP and thus in local ownership of security governance or 2) in the mere 
coexistence of local government institutions and the local branch of the PNP, and thus a security 
governance led and dominated by the local PNP. 
The first type of local security governance strengthens local PNP commitment to local networks 
and solutions and establishes a horizontal group of task-oriented actors bound together by mutual 
trust and joint experience. This horizontal bonding and binding complements the otherwise exclusive 
vertical bond of the PNP branch to the center. It requires active LGU chief executives who make local 
citizen security governance part and parcel of their political agenda and bridge the formal institution-
al divide between the local PNP branch and local governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-gov-
ernmental institutions that play various roles in local security governance. Successful establishment 
of such local security governance networks enhances local PNP resilience to central directives in 
times of conflict between local and central aims or strategies. The bonds established in these net-
works also provide the levers for local chief executives to commit the local PNP branch to local solu-
tions in times of externally induced crises and shocks. By utilizing previously established trust, LGU 
executives can, to a significant extent, counteract the escalatory top-down dynamics emanating from 
the national leadership. 
The second type of local security governance enhances PNP bonding with and loyalty to the PNP 
hierarchy and minimizes its commitment to local actors. Here, a passive local political leadership 
largely avoids the politically unrewarding topic of crime control, leaving this to the local branch of the 
PNP. Lacking established task-oriented networks embedding the local branch of the PNP, the local 
PNP leadership acts as an unquestioning enforcer of orders and policy lines coming down through 
the organizational hierarchy. 
The bulk of this report consists of a comparison of seven structurally fairly comparable LGUs, six 
of which are located in the northern half or directly north of the NCR and directly adjacent to each 
other (see map on cover). With Davao City, a seventh LGU is included, the metropolis of the Philip-
pine South and for decades governed by the current president and now by his daughter Sara Duter-
te-Carpio. Because a fundamental characteristic of Philippine politics is that all politics is personal 
and familial, the individual chief executives are at the core of the analyses. 
The analysis of local government reactions to Duterte’s having given carte blanche powers to 
those carrying out the campaign showed a high level of activism of the leaders formerly active in 
citizen security governance. This was designed to strengthen the bonds of the PNP to the local secu-
rity-related environment. In all three cases, police and vigilante killings rose only modestly during the 
initial year of Duterte’s presidency, when central pressure was strongest. 
By contrast, the four formerly passive chief executives gave prominence to symbols of political 
submission to the new administration and largely left the implementation of the national policies to 
the local branch of the PNP. This not only resulted in a huge spike of deadly police violence during 
the first year of the war on drugs. It also facilitated excessive levels of vigilantism that seem to have 
gone unchecked in these LGUs.
The result of this analysis is highly ambivalent. 
The violence-inhibiting spin-off of local chief executives taking an activist stance on crime con-
trol is the upside of an otherwise often negative dynamic when local elites establish local fiefdoms 
that can be utilized to maximize their personal political control and economic interests. Given the 
prevalence of personality and family-focused politics controlled by the political elite and demanded 
by the vast majority of the electorate, the rule of law will, for the time being, continue to be narrowly 
confined to the rule of individuals. And given that surmounting the rule of persons is impossible for 
the time being, any hope of change relies on the emergence of a larger number of active political 
leaders exhibiting political visions for their constituents that go beyond expanding of personal and 
family power, authority and wealth. 
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1. IntroduCtIon
In May 2016 Rodrigo Duterte was elected president of the Philippines on the promise to rid the 
country of illegal drugs in a three- to six-month period. From Duterte’s first full day as president on 
July 1, 2016 to May 31, 2020, there were 5,722 persons killed by the police in the course of the on-
going campaign, according to official data from the Philippine National Police (PNP) (#RealNum-
bersPH 2020). Of these 2,144 (37.5%) died during the first six and a half months (Government of 
the Philippines 2017). 
Given that the Philippine National Police is a national institution owing its loyalty to the presi-
dent and with a fairly uniform organizational culture, a fairly uniform reaction to the carte blanche 
issued by the president legitimating the killing of suspects would be expected. Only structural dif-
ferences between local government units (LGUs) should influence the intensity of the national war 
on drugs at the local level, such as for example differences in urbanization, poverty and inequality 
or differences in the magnitudes of drug-related as well as other forms of serious crime such as 
intentional homicide or robbery. However, in the Philippines, local reaction varied widely between 
LGUs that were fairly similar in many other respects. 
This report focuses on variation between seven highly urbanized LGUs (five independent cities 
and two provinces), six of which are situated in the northern part of the National Capital Region 
(NCR = Metro Manila) or directly to the north of the NCR (see map on cover). They were chosen 
because they are similar in many respects, as similar as possible in a real-life setting in the Philip-
pines.1 Thus, if structural variables were of crucial explanatory value, broadly similar reactions to 
the president’s instructions would be expected. However, local levels of deadly police and vigilante 
violence varied dramatically. Three LGUs (Valenzuela City, Pampanga province, Davao City) react-
ed only in a very muted way, whereas in the four others (Caloocan City, Manila City, Quezon City and 
Bulacan province) fatal police violence exploded, accompanied by high levels of vigilante killings. 
This report provides a political explanation for these differences in police use of fatal force at 
the local level. It is argued that in the Philippines the role of local government and especially its 
chief executive should not be underestimated. While this argument might seem fairly obvious, it 
has largely escaped scientific scrutiny. If subnational politics can influence local police behavior 
for better or worse, it may be argued that police reform is bound to underperform or fail, as long as 
the dynamics emanating from this political environment are not considered.
The argument advanced here for the case of the Philippines is based on two salient points. 
First, there is a huge dependency of the local branches of the PNP on local government financing. 
Second, local chief executives at all subnational levels of politics wield significant disciplinary and 
operational control over the local PNP. Crucial for the actual relationship is how these opportuni-
ties for local intervention are utilized. 
1  See the online appendix for a comparative presentation of poverty rates, population growth and density, ratio of police 
officers to population, and levels of index crime (figures 5, 11; tables 3, 5). Download: hsfk.de/Report0520-Appendix
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Fig. 1:  Map of analyzed provinces and cities (Templates: Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0,   
https://bit.ly/38PAZCP, edited)
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Here, the personality of the chief executive comes into play, as in the Philippines all political 
power and authority resides in the individuals who fill the chief executive positions. It is sufficient 
here to mention terms such as simply “boss,” a selection of case studies of “local politics in the 
Philippines” (Lacaba 1995) as well as “bossism,” a concept of elite capture of the Philippine state 
(Sidel 1999). Others link bosses to their families, speaking of the Philippines as “an Anarchy of 
Families” (McCoy 1994) leading to “power without virtue” (Azurin 2008), “booty capitalism” (Hutch-
croft 1998), and an “anti-development state” (Bello 2005) or an “oligarchipelago” (Almeida 2012). 
This report argues that, prior to Rodrigo Duterte winning the presidential election, local chief 
executives differed with respect to the salience of citizen security in their political agenda and the 
role of local government-based networks in the provision of citizen security. Two extremes, the ac-
tive versus the passive local government chief executive can be distinguished: 
Active chief executives make citizen security and crime control an important part of their politi-
cal agenda and aim at local ownership of the local policies. These chief executives establish dense 
networks of actors, including the local branch of the PNP. These actors are tasked with various 
aspects of citizen security. Joint development of security policies, as well as joint or cooperative 
implementation aim at establishing local ownership. Local initiative and regular interaction can 
also bring about the inclusion of the local branch of the PNP into the group of state, quasi-state and 
non-state actors that share responsibility for local citizen-security governance. 
City, provincial and municipal police directors are administratively subordinated to and expect-
ed to act as local representatives of the higher echelons of the police hierarchy. In LGUs with active 
chief executives, vertical bonds and accountability of police directors may be counteracted by local 
patterns of cooperation and the informal ties of mutual trust and obligation. In times of conflict be-
tween vertical and horizontal loyalty, local chief executives have at least a fair chance of influenc-
ing “their” police director. In the case of Duterte’s war against crime, formerly active LGU leaders 
reacted by outwardly signaling general but limited support for the presidential campaign. At the 
same time, they reinforced local networks that enabled them to enhance their informal control over 
and bonds with the local PNP. As a result, they mitigated the escalatory dynamic ema¬nating from 
the higher levels of the police hierarchy. 
Passive chief executives evade making this politically unrewarding field of local politics part 
of their political agenda, leaving it to the legally responsible state institution, the PNP. This results 
in the mere coexistence of LGU and the local branch of the PNP. Given the lack or scarcity of past 
experience of joint activity, mutual trust and commitment are largely absent. In these LGUs, vertical 
accountability of the police director reigns supreme. Confronted with demands for fealty and loyal-
ty to the center, as was the case during the initial year of the Duterte campaign, these chief execu-
tives signaled punitive stances and ostensibly strong support for the center. As previously, actual 
crime-control was left to the local PNP director. Thrown back on the vertical ties to the higher levels 
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of the PNP hierarchy, local police directors opted for a more violent strategy of crime control that 
satisfied the center’s demands.2 
Given that in the Philippines the decision for an active role in security governance is primarily 
reached by the local chief executive, local ownership can function to the advantage or detriment 
of local public interest, depending on the interests of the chief executive. In general, such under-
mining of bureaucratic lines of com¬mand and control through informal, extra-institutional bonds 
of loyalty and belonging is viewed highly criti¬cally. The clientelist logic directly contradicts core 
principles of the rule of law and bureaucratic insulation against political interference. In this spe-
cific case, however, the clientelist rationale serves as the basis for successful resistance to radical 
demands emanating from the center that went squarely against lawful policing.
This report provides an initial exploratory analysis of seven LGU chief executives’ policies with 
respect to citizen security prior to Rodrigo Duterte’s term in office as president and their reaction 
to the anti-crime cam¬paign in the wake of his election. The primary focus is on the initial year of 
Duterte’s presidency from July 2016 to June 2017, when both police and vigilante fatal violence 
peaked.
Chapters 2 and 3 provide information on the legal framework for the LGU-PNP relationship at 
the subnational level as well as data on patterns of police use of deadly force for the LGUs under 
study for the decade preceding (2006–2015) and the first three and a half years of the Duterte pres-
idency (7/2016–12/2019). Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the case studies that provide the empirical 
meat on the conceptual bones of this report. Chapter 6 concludes this report by pulling the various 
threads together and discussing what the results suggest for the future of Philippine democracy 
and research on police violence. 
2. polICe-polItICS relatIonS In the phIlIppIneS at the 
SubnatIonal level 
The Philippine National Police is a national multi-level institution divided into several layers down 
to the municipal level. Despite the appearance of a multi-level hierarchy with clear lines of com-
mand and control, the PNP is only weakly insulated against political interference at all levels of 
subnational government. 
For police directors at all levels there are varying maximum tenures in their position, meaning 
police directors at the provincial and city level are generally replaced within two years. Local chief 
executives have a strong voice in the selection process for police directors, as they can pick their 
favorite from a shortlist. Further, local chief executives at all levels down to the municipality are 
deputized as representatives of the National Police Commission. In this function they convene and 
2  For a graphical representation of the two different forms of local security governance see the online appendix, Figure 
1. 
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chair the peace and order councils, develop and oversee public safety plans. Mayors also “exercise 
operational supervision and control” over the local PNP, meaning that they have “the power to di-
rect, superintend and oversee the day-to-day functions of police investigation of crime, crime pre-
vention activities […].” They can decide on the utilization of local PNP personnel and units, impose 
certain disciplinary penalties for minor offenses on the local PNP personnel and also recommend 
the recall or reassignment of the chief of police and the appointment of new members of the PNP 
(see No. 8551, further: Republic Act No. 6975, No. 7160). It is an irony that mayors also control and 
supervise the anti-gambling operations within their jurisdiction, given the multitude of reports link-
ing local government executives to rent-seeking from illegal gambling.3
What makes local chief executives potentially even more powerful is that the PNP budget is far 
from sufficient to cover the costs of policing. Thus, the LGUs are responsible for providing a sub-
stantial proportion of mainte¬nance and investment costs, often paying for water and electricity, 
footing the bill for gasoline, buying new motorcycles, cars, and weaponry, augmenting police offi-
cers’ pay, providing the premises for police offices and fairly often also paying for modernization 
of buildings, etc. Thus, to a large extent the PNP is national in name, but can be local in practice, 
if LGU chief executives decide to make use of their legal powers and the economic dependency 
relationship. 
3. loCal polICe uSe of deadly forCe before and durIng the 
duterte preSIdenCy 
Duterte’s war against drugs and the carte blanche given to police and vigilantes alike unleashed 
a sudden torrent of deadly violence. However, this violence spread unevenly throughout the var-
ious LGUs. The highest level of violence (both in absolute numbers and adjusted to population) 
has been observed in the densely populated NCR, adjacent Central Luzon, and CALABARZON, as 
well as the metropolitan regions of the middle and southern Philippines, in other words, Cebu and 
Davao. This is in line with violence patterns of the pre-Duterte decade. Figures 1 and 2 below4 show 
that the average level of deadly police violence before and during Duterte at the national level was 
below that of many highly urbanized LGUs analyzed in this report. The two figures also show that 
neither the magnitude nor the temporal patterns were uniform within the selected group of highly 
urbanized LGUs.  
3  For a detailed overview of the legal basis of local LGU-police relations with a special focus on the LGUs in the an-
ti-drug policy, see Lischin 2018. Lischin argues for a detailed analysis of local-level politics in this sphere, hoping that 
this can show how “barangays and cities can curtail the potentially criminal excesses of the central government in 
the maintenance of peace and order.”
4  The respective data for violence in the pre-Duterte and Duterte periods were compiled by the author and the ABS-
CBN Investigative and Research Group, respectively. For details on the datasets, see the online appendix (Figures 2 
and 3), which also provides the exact data underlying the graphic representations. For comprehensive overviews of 
pre-Duterte and Duterte data on magnitude and spatial as well as temporal variation in police violence, see Kreuzer 
2016, 2018, 2019.
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What we see are highly individualized temporal patterns and overall magnitudes of police vio-
lence for the pre-Duterte decade. This translated into fundamentally different reactions of the var-
ious LGUs in the wake of Duterte being elected (7/2016–6/2017). 
Fig. 2: Suspects killed by PNP per million population per year 2006–2015
To reiterate, the focus of the following analysis is on explaining one specific period in time: the first 
year Duterte was in office as president from July 2016 to June 2017. Here we see a strong bifur-
cation (Figure 2 below), with four of the highly urbanized units, Manila, Quezon City, Caloocan and 
Bulacan reacting strongly to the center’s appeal, whereas the other three units hardly reacted at all. 
While the Davao City reaction was somewhat higher than the overall Philippine average, the other 
two units, Valenzuela and Pampanga, had lower than average reactions. The difference becomes 
even more pronounced, when the reported cases of vigilante killings during the first year of the 
Duterte presidency are added in. Documented vigilante killings stood at 1.3 per million population 
for Pampanga, 3.2 for Valenzuela, and 3.0 for Davao City, contrasted with 24.4 for Quezon City, 26 
for Manila, 27.9 for Bulacan, and a staggering 88 for Caloocan (ABS-CBN dataset). While the three 
units that were comparatively low with regard to deadly police violence were also able and willing 
to control vigilantism during the initial phase of the Duterte campaign, the other four were either 
not capable or unwilling to stop vigilantism.
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Fig. 3: Suspects killed by PNP per million population per year 7/2016 to 12/2019
4. mItIgatIng the natIonal CampaIgn: three aCtIve ChIef 
exeCutIveS
The following analyses focus on three LGUs with chief executives who shared a strong interest in citi-
zen security that preceded the Duterte campaign by several years. All three had an image as tough and 
discipline-oriented politicians and reacted to the Duterte campaign in ways that reduced the predictable 
impact of the presidential injunction to kill. Otherwise the three display fundamentally different lead-
ership personae, ranging from rationalist reformer to caring patron to tough strong (wo)man. While all 
three were equally able to curb violence dynamics emanating from the center, local dynamics driving 
police use of deadly force differed, with the most hardline stance by Davao City mayor Sara Duter-
te-Carpio resulting in a somewhat higher overall number of police killings during the first year of her fa-
ther’s presidency. This clearly signals that “local ownership” need not translate into low police kill rates, 
even though it seems to translate into strong local resilience and capacity to blunt national excesses. 
The case studies follow a broadly parallel design. They give a short introduction to the background 
of the chief executives, and provide core information on the pre-Duterte magnitude and patterns of po-
lice use of deadly force and on police and vigilante killings for the initial period of the Duterte campaign 
from July 2016 onwards. Then they analyze the three chief executives’ public statements on citizen 
security and LGUs’ prior practices in this area before July 2016. Finally, they detail how the chief exec-
utives reacted to the Duterte campaign both with respect to their policy stances and the local practice 
of implementation of the national push against crime.  
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4.1 THE GATCHALIAN BROTHERS: RATIONALIST MANAGERS OF VALENZUELA 
From 2004 to the present Valenzuela has been governed by members of the Gatchalian family. The po-
litical rise of the family goes back to 2001, when the heirs of a business dynasty began translating their 
business acumen into political power after Sherwin, one of four brothers, was elected congress repre-
sentative of the first district of Valenzuela. In 2004 he became city mayor. Since then, the Gatchalian 
brothers have accumulated political power as mayor, congress representative and, since 2016, also 
as senator (for an overview of political positions held by three of the four brothers and their economic 
background, see the online appendix: “Gatchalian”). 
4.1.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng the duterte preSIdenCy
In Valenzuela City pre-Duterte police use of deadly force was “bifurcated” into a long period of almost 
zero killings (2006, 2010–2015, with a total of one suspect reportedly killed by the police) and a short 
period of three years, 2007–2009, during which 21 suspects were killed. Operational leadership for 
these operations seems not to have lain with Valenzuela City Police but with Police Special Forces and 
the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces. With Valenzuela police in command, the use of deadly 
force was very rare. From 2010 to 2015 Valenzuela police killed about 0.28 suspects per million inhabi-
tants and year. The ABS-CBN dataset suggests that this low level of police use of deadly force translat-
ed into a comparatively muted reaction to the Duterte administrations proclamation of a war on crime. 
During the first six months six suspects were reportedly killed, five of them in the initial month of July 
2016. There was only one documented suspect killed for the whole of 2017, 16 reported for 2018 and 
five for 2019 (see Figure 2 above). The overall rate over the past three and a half years, from July 2016 
to December 2019, stood at 9.5 killings per million population and year, which is about the same as the 
rates for the years 2015 to 2019 for Phoenix (Arizona). As will be shown below, this is lower than the 
pre-Duterte average for the neighboring cities of Manila and Quezon. In Valenzuela, vigilantism played 
no role in the war on crime. While there were four cases of vigilante-style killings reported in more than 
three years, it is doubtful that these are linked to the police campaign, as targeted killings have been and 
still are a widespread phenomenon in the Philippines, often unrelated to state-orchestrated violence. 
4.1.2 loCal CItIzen-SeCurIty before duterte
From the outset of their political engagement in Valenzuela in the early 2000s the Gatchalian brothers 
have publicly voiced a tough anti-crime stance, and over time have developed a crime-control ideology 
that on the one hand emphasizes supporting and modernizing the local PNP, and on the other hand em-
bedding the PNP in a dense network of local government affiliated crime-control activities. 
At the core of the Gatchalian brothers’ conception of crime control and local LGU-PNP relations are 
the concepts of professionalism, managerialism, and discipline, as well as a cooperative relationship 
between local institutions and the local PNP and shared responsibility for citizen security. Ideological-
ly, the local chief executives have linked crime to poverty and lack of opportunity for the poor, arguing: 
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“Employment is empowerment […] it does not only improve living conditions […] but reduce the under-
lying social glitches of poverty […], such as crimes” (Sherwin Gatchalian quoted in Valenzuela Govern-
ment 2012). This link between poverty and crime was given even more prominence under Duterte, when 
Sherwin Gatchalian argued:
We cannot win the war on drugs without waging a war on poverty at the same time […]. Oth-
erwise, poor Filipinos in desperate situations will always be tempted to turn to crime if given 
no other option to escape from crushing poverty. (Gatchalian 2016, see also Gatchalian 2018)
This focus on poverty as a root cause of crime was translated into politics. In 2006 Valenzuela’s official 
poverty level was higher than Quezon City’s and on a par with Caloocan, Manila. In 2018 it was the sec-
ond lowest in the NCR, second only to Makati’s, in other words, the core business center’s poverty level 
(see online appendix, Figure 5). By taking responsibility for citizen security, the mayor also made clear 
that he would not “use the police as scapegoats for security lapses” (Wingatchalian 2015). 
Unlike many other LGUs, Valenzuela had an active city peace and order council years before Duterte 
became president, with the mayor taking a symbolically prominent role in its activities, as, for example, 
when awarding cash incentives to policemen and social workers for their crucial roles in the crackdown 
on a human trafficking syndicate (Valenzuela Government 2011a), or regularly supporting the local PNP 
with a new “modern” head¬quarters, a large carpark, a large quantity of other equipment and a city 
crime laboratory, all parts of a wider “Valenzuela Police Station Capability Enhancement Program.”
This “distributive policy” may be categorized as a fairly normal practice. In Valenzuela it is comple-
mented by activities that go beyond the expected normal behavioral style. The symbolism of linking 
police, LGU and organized civil society became an important ingredient of local policy. In 2011, contrary 
to all established practices, the new city police director was not chosen by the city mayor from among 
five recommendations by the Philippine National Police. Instead the “City Government organized a 
Multi-Sectoral Selection Committee […] to involve the public in the selection process” (Valenzuela Gov-
ernment 2011b). When two years later, the City police was provided with 40 motorcycles for their newly 
created Tactical Motorized Riders (TMR) group, this new force was linked to a newly established vol-
unteer group “Valenzuela Riders Against Criminals” that was expected to “act as ‘force multipliers’ to 
the TMR to maintain peace and order” (Valenzuela Government 2013). Thus, local ownership was to be 
established, with the police bound to and included in the local group of responsible agents for citizen 
security. Symbolically, citizen security was rationalized as a core task of local government, an indis-
pensable requirement for development. Davao City, where Rodrigo Duterte had been mayor for most 
of the past three decades, had been regarded as a positive role model already years before Duterte 
became president. In 2014 Sherwin Gatchalian argued that “in any country and locality, peace and order 
is very important. […] And I can see that the local government of Davao City is really serious about the 
peace and order” (Wingatchalian 2014a). 
Valenzuela leadership had also been explicitly focused on the fight against drugs and drug crime 
since 2015 before Duterte took office as president. It implemented a holistic approach that defined drug 
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dependency as a health issue and the fight against illegal drugs as an inclusive endeavor uniting gov-
ernment, police, civil society and “every city resident” (Valenzuela Government 2015). Core strategies 
advocated included the teaching of livelihood skills as alternatives to selling drugs and the promotion 
of community activities as a deterrence against drug abuse, improved access to healthcare, hous-
ing, and justice, and heightened vigilance. Repression was only one segment in a wider no-tolerance 
policy, and the repressive component was to be clearly within the bounds of the rule of law. Sherwin 
Gatchalian, an outspoken proponent of the death penalty, cautioned in 2014: “before we even talk about 
death penalty, there should be reforms in the police and judiciary first. […] If we impose death penalty, 
there is a huge possibility that the innocent will be put on the death row even without credible evidence” 
(Wingatchalian 2014b). 
4.1.3 loCal CItIzen-SeCurIty durIng the duterte CampaIgn
When Duterte became President and initiated his war on drugs, pre-established networks and mutual 
trust in the sphere of crime-control could be utilized by the mayor to insulate the LGU to a significant 
extent against the trend of sharply increasing use of deadly force by police. 
Crucially, the Valenzuela mayor took the initiative with a twofold strategy: on the one hand sup-
porting the government campaign, on the other, reducing its effects at the local level. He aimed at en-
listing local govern¬ment units and civil society, so that the local PNP would be embedded. While the 
police ostensibly took up the nationally prescribed anti-drug strategy, this was augmented by a local 
“VC Cares Plus” program. This aimed at ensuring that drug users surrendering to the authorities were 
taken care of by local officials and doctors and also provided with “job placement assistance once they 
have completed the treatment” in the context of a “Community-Based Wellness Program” that aimed 
at helping “the identified drug suspect-surrenderees to immerse them back in their communities and 
encourage them to renounce their drug addiction” (Valenzuela Government 2016a). The Valenzuela An-
ti-Drug Abuse Council (VADAC) and the local PNP launched a local campaign “Valenzuelanos Ayaw sa 
Droga” [Valenzuelanos do not take drugs] that activated the “Barangay Peacekeeping Action Teams” 
(BPATS) (Valenzuela Government 2016b). Students were also approached and activated as members 
of the Student Anti-Drug Abuse Councils. Tok-Hang operations, in other words, police officers contact-
ing drug suspects in order to convince them to turn themselves in to the authorities, seem to have been 
consistently “composed of the PNP, barangay official, VADAC official and a CSWD [City Welfare and 
Development] personnel” (Valenzuela Government 2017). 
The mayor also reiterated his prior stance that the local government 
wants to extend not only moral but also economic support to drug offenders who are will-
ing to adhere to the government mandates and change their lives for the better. […] the local 
government is treating drug dependency as a health issue and, therefore the local govern-
ment should address these needs by the constituents as part of its social welfare services. 
(Valenzuela Government 2016c)
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The LGU, in this case the Anti-Drug Abuse Council (ADAC), also managed to signal its preference 
for rule of law-based behavior by, for example, providing lawyers and paralegals “to assist the local 
policemen in building cases that strongly stand up” (Valenzuela Government 2016d). In addition, the 
local ADAC, the city prosecutor’s office and the regional trial court collaborated in a seminar teaching 
local policemen how to correctly handle drug-related cases (Valenzuela Government 2016e). Sig-
naling the importance of rule of law-based policing, Mayor Gatchalian personally visited the first 
batch of local police officers who completed the training. He also offered an incentive of P 100,000 
for teams that successfully convict a drug offender in court (Valen¬zuela Government 2016d). This 
contrasts with a number of LGUs, where police officers were offered financial rewards for killing sus-
pects. The mayor’s brother, newly elected Senator Sherwin Gatchalian, assumed the same stance at 
the national level. Barely 10 days into the Duterte campaign, he appealed to the PNP and the National 
Police Commission to stick to the rule of law: 
The criminals involved with the drug trade should be brought to justice, but justice also 
mandates that they be given their day in court. I have no problem with sending drug lords 
to their death, as long as they have been convicted of their crimes in court […]. Justice must 
not be handed down through unjust means. (Wingatchalian 2016)
Aimed at remedying the weakness of the police in building cases were other LGU activities. 
Valenzuela led the way in providing sniffer dogs for the city police (Philstar 2018) thus enhancing 
chances of proving drug possession in a legal way. Valenzuela also provided new police vehicles 
equipped with a global positioning system and dashboard cameras, enabling better documentation 
and control of police activities. While incomplete, available data on the share of city budget appropri-
ated to the PNP suggest that the local government also actively “bought” local police loyalty. Where-
as in the years preceding Duterte official annual appropriations in the proposed budgets stood at 5 
to 6 million Philippine Pesos (PP; approx. 80,000 €), this rose to 8 million PP in 2017 and more than 
20 million PP per year (approx. 322,000 €) from 2018 to 2020 (Valenzuela Government no date). This 
represents only a fraction of the financial assistance provided by the LGU. Patrol vehicles, guns, am-
munition and sniffer dogs totaled about 66 million PP (>1 million €) for 2018. In addition, the LGU also 
seems to have provided personal incentives to the local police. Hard data only exist for 2017 when the 
city government augmented the salaries of the local policemen with 17 million Pesos, with the police 
director receiving an additional P 4,000 per month (Badilla 2018). 
These measures combine into an overall strategy maximizing the local character of the police 
force. In 2018 the mayor expressly stated that Valenzuela aimed at a “self-sustained police force” 
(Philstar 2018). A “self-sustained police force” may work out differently depending on local condi-
tions. In this case it worked as a violence-mitigating device, being controlled by strong, hardline but 
rule of law-focused local political leaders, who perceived citizen security as a core element in their 
portfolio as chief executive. Based on past establishment of local ownership of crime-control policy, 
the LGU could successfully superimpose horizontal local commitments and allegiances in cooper-
ative problem-solving over the top-down demands for PNP allegiance to waging the war on drugs. 
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4.2 LILIA PIÑEDA: THE TOUGH BUT CARING PATRON OF KAMPAMPANGANS5 
From 2010 to 2019 Pampanga was ruled by Governor Lilia Piñeda. From 2013 to 2019 her son Den-
nis joined her as vice governor. Due to term-limit rules Lilia could not contest the 2019 gubernatorial 
elections, so the mother-son team decided to switch positions. Since then Pampanga has been ruled 
by Dennis Piñeda, with his mother as vice governor (for details on the political positions of family 
members, see the online appendix: Pineda). 
4.2.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng the duterte preSIdenCy
When Lilia Piñeda won the 2010 contest for governor, crime-control was one of the initial foci of her 
work and police use of deadly force patterns changed immediately (see Figure 3 below and Figure 6 
in the online appendix). All 2010 incidents with police use of deadly force occurred after her election 
to governor. 
Fig. 4: Suspects killed by the police in Pampanga 2006–2019
For Pampanga the overall rate of police killings per million inhabitants for the pre-Duterte decade 
from 2006 to 2015 stood at 1.9 suspects killed per million population. For the governorship of Lilia 
Piñeda from July 2010 to June 2016 it stood at 3.7, if the very specific cases of police-rebel encoun-
ters are excluded. Of these 44 suspects, a full seven were killed by the police in May and June 2016, 
after the election, but before the inaugu¬ration of Duterte as president. Yet, in July 2016 already po-
lice violence seemed partly under control. After six killings in June, numbers came down to four in 
5  Kapampangan is an ethnolinguistic group living principally in Pampanga and adjacent regions. In a political sense it 
stands for the people of Pampanga. 
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July. Also, vigilantes played no role in Pampanga. For the three and a half years from July 2016 to 
December 2019 ABS-CBN recorded a total of only six cases, a low number by Philippine standards. 
But, how is the spike during the third year of the Duterte presidency to be explained? A more 
detailed analysis suggests that this spike in violence is largely linked to the tenure of Nicolas Sal-
vador as provincial police director (see online appendix, Figure 7). During his short seven-month 
stint in office from May to December 2018, 19 suspects were killed by the police. Salvador’s case 
suggests that police directors who exert control with an overly hard hand may not remain in office 
for long in Pampanga – in this case Salvador was replaced by a director with a great deal of local 
experience, among other things as city director of the Pampanga capital, San Fernando: Jean Fa-
jardo, who was in this position until October 1, 2020.
To sum up: as far as can be ascertained, the Duterte war against drugs left hardly any trace on 
patterns or magnitude of deadly police violence in Pampanga. Then how did the local government 
manage to thwart the dynamics in play at the national level? 
4.2.2 loCal CItIzen-SeCurIty before duterte
Although she displayed a different leadership style from the Gatchalian brothers, Lilia Piñeda also 
adopted citizen security as part of her policy agenda from the early days of her governorship. At 
the core of her leader¬ship persona is the caring patron.
Lilia Piñeda is regularly referred to as “Nanay” (mom) and described as “the ‘mother’ of all 
Kapampangans with her genuine maternal affection,” with an overarching focus on “politics for the 
poor and downtrodden” (Manabat 2015b) and “the champion of the sick and the poor” (Pavia 2010). 
Her almost saintly image has even been reinforced by the local clergy (see: Lacson 2012, Nanay 
Foundation 2019: XVI). 
One core segment of Lilia Piñeda’s caring image has been a tough anti-drug crime stance and a 
strong focus on law and order. While she shared the vision of the later Duterte campaign – a drug-
free society – her strategy was different: “We need to ensure the rehabilitation and safety of the 
drug users and jail the pushers” (Piñeda 2014 quoted in SunStar Pampanga 2014a). At the core of 
her thinking was a rather simple disciplinarian attitude, expressed after a 2015 visit to Davao City, 
when Piñeda emphasized copying Duterte’s “political will […] in enforcing laws and ordinances that 
may result to the greater benefits of the Kapampangans” (SunStar Pampanga 2015). 
Like other provincial governors, Piñeda regularly supported the provincial PNP with hardware of 
various types, but at the same time she strengthened the capacity of the local barangays to coop-
erate with the police, for example, by strengthening the Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse Councils (BAD-
AC), with the aim of making the LGUs “effective partners of the local police and elected officials in 
strengthening our efforts in the prevention of crime and maintenance of peace and order” (Piñeda 
quoted in Sun.Star Pampanga 2014b). 
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Already two years before Duterte was elected president, the Aquino government focused on 
crime in the Oplan Lambat Sibat [Operational Plan Net and Spear],6 a nationwide anti-crime drive 
that also spearheaded the “one time, big time” (OTBT) operations that were to become a hallmark 
of later Duterte-period police practice. When the superordinate national and regional level of the 
PNP tried to push for a tougher anti-crime policy from 2014 onward, she reacted by further em-
bedding the provincial police in a network of social control already established in a rudimentary 
fashion in the preceding years. Thus, in 2014 she created a task force that cooper¬ated with the 
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Barangay Anti-Drug Abuse Councils. She also 
held various anti-drug summits signaling the provincial government’s leadership in the anti-drug 
campaign, and gave prominence to provincial government support to the Central Luzon Drug Reha-
bilitation Center. Already in 2014, civil society organizations like the homeowners’ association were 
involved in the governor’s campaign against drug crime. 
In the context of Oplan Lambat Sibat, the new Central Luzon regional police director Rudy Laca-
din instructed his subordinates “to neutralize at least 50 percent of your drug personalities within 
two months” in order to avoid replacement (Lacadin quoted in Manabat 2015a). Piñeda broadened 
the informal control of the police and strengthened her campaign against drugs with a specific 
focus on local village watch organizations. In 2015, for example, she lauded the efforts of the 
approximately 10,000 bantay bayan members (informal village watches organized in the Bantay 
Bayan Foundation) for their help in the fight against drugs that led to the arrest of approximately 
2,000 “drug personalities” in the province in 2015 (Pampanga Provincial Government 2015, see also 
Sapnu 2014). 
4.2.3 loCal CItIzen SeCurIty durIng the duterte CampaIgn
When Duterte started his nationwide war against drugs, Piñeda reacted swiftly. Similarly to other 
provincial governors, she released success stories about 10,000 drug suspects surrendering within 
the first two weeks of the campaign. She also adopted the rhetoric of an all-out war against drugs. 
At the same time the provincial government and many municipalities utilized significant parts of 
their intelligence funds to “combat the prolif¬eration of illegal drugs” (Pampanga Provincial Gov-
ernment 2016a). This money was allocated for a rehabilitation program (Dalan Ning Pamagbayu; 
Path to Change). 
Repeatedly, the governor publicly stated her core aim: to avoid killings of fellow Kapampan-
gans. To avoid fatal violence, she asked drug users to surrender, saying: ”nobody will be killed here 
in Pampanga. (Pampanga Provincial Government 2016b). She also stated that “I don’t want any 
Kapampangan dead because of illegal drugs. We’ll give them another chance. I’m going to meet 
their parents or their families because they are responsible for the drug suspects. (Pampanga Pro-
6  Oplan Lambat Sibat was conceptionalized as “a deliberate, programmatic, and sustained approach taken by the 
Philippine National Police to combat criminality nationwide. It uses both wide dragnet and intel-targeted operations 
to catch small-time criminals and repeat offenders” (Junsay, Mary C./Lyscka J:G. Brucal/Emher Antonio/Rowena E. 
Mojares 2017). 
GOVERNORS AND MAYORS IN THE PHILIPPINES 15
vincial Government 2016c). And emphasized that “I am the mother of the Kapampangans. Tell the 
surrenderees [sic] that I cannot protect them if they will go back to their bad habit of using illegal 
drug. I tell you, it will cost them their lives” (SunStar Pampanga 2016).
This message was complemented by strategies strengthening social control in the commu-
nities on the one hand and informally reducing the autonomy of the police on the other: she first 
requested the provincial police director and the local police directors not to knock on the suspects’ 
doors but let the village chiefs take on that duty, i.e., establish an official local civilian presence to 
witness the Tokhang-operations (knocking at suspects doors and asking them to surrender). She 
also provided significant financial support to the provincial PNP and the Philippine Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (PDEA). She promised educational and livelihood assistance to former drug suspects 
who surrendered. Already in August 2016, she established the Cabalen (Fellow Kapampangans) 
Drug Watch of barangay officials, bantay bayan members, health workers and activated a women’s 
group with several thousand members organized by her several years earlier (Nanay community 
volunteers), to help monitor their own and other peoples’ families more closely (Punto 2016). 
By 2017, Pampanga also had a fairly strong program in place that provided additional options 
by employing drug offenders, who turned themselves in, in various short-term jobs in the local 
administration (Sunstar Pam¬panga 2017). The provincial government even “ordered all chiefs of 
police […] in the province to employ and make the drug reformists productive to help and augment 
the income of their families through livelihood and training programs” (Pampanga Provincial Gov-
ernment 2017). 
In the case of Lilia Piñeda, the combination of caring mother and strongman personality, as 
well as the credible anti-drug policy that established local leadership in citizen security clearly 
predates the advent of Duterte as president. In 2016 it allowed provincial governor Piñeda to make 
use of pre-existing networks and established practices in order to broaden LGU control over police 
interventions in the war on drugs. Thus, police use of deadly force was kept under control, as were 
vigilante killings. 
4.3 SARA DUTERTE-CARPIO: PEACE AND ORDER AS “THE BACKBONE OF ALL ECONOMIES” 
IN DAVAO CITY
Davao City is “Duterteland.” The current president was mayor of Davao for most of the years be-
tween 1988 and 2016. Since 2007 his children have taken to politics with his son Paolo as barangay 
chairman, vice-mayor and current congressman, his other son Sebastian as vice-mayor since 2019, 
and his daughter and political heir as vice-mayor (2007–2010) and mayor (2010–2013; since 2016; 
see the online appendix for more information about the Duterte family in politics). 
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4.3.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng the duterte preSIdenCy
In the 1980s Davao City was dubbed the “murder capital of the Philippines” (Branigin 1985). Ac-
cording to the public myth, this city was “tamed” by a public prosecutor turned mayor, Rodrigo 
Duterte, who during his more than two decades as mayor did not shy away from utilizing a death 
squad in his quest to rid the city of crime. This “victory” came at the price of approximately 1,400 
crime suspects killed by the death squad from 1998 to 2015 (Picardal 2016). 
This city seems an unlikely choice as an example of an LGU where police use of deadly force 
remained controlled in the wake of the presidential call to kill all suspects if they dared to resist 
(Kreuzer 2016). Given the carte blanche provided by the president, either a rash of police killings, or 
an excessive level of vigilante killings, or both, would be expected. 
However, the ABS-CBN dataset suggests a limited spike in police use of deadly force during 
the first months of the campaign, followed by a stabilization at the highest pre-campaign levels of 
approximately 17 killings per million inhabitants per year, albeit with a rising tendency from 2017/18 
to 2019. Even more surprising is that this coincides with the very low number of five suspected vig-
ilante killings in the initial phase and only one additional case in August 2019. For an explanation 
of this surprising finding it is necessary to turn to the current mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio, who had 
already worked with her father as vice-mayor and mayor from 2007 to 2013 and was her father’s 
preferred choice as his successor in 2016. 
4.3.2 loCal CItIzen SeCurIty before the duterte preSIdenCy
At first sight, Sara Duterte-Carpio provided continuity from her father when she took over as may-
or for the first time in 2010. In her first state of the city address she emphasized that “Peace and 
order is the backbone for all economies.” However, examination of the details of her planned poli-
cies shows a rather broad conceptualization of crime control, focusing on “a drug-free workplace 
and widespread drug testing, on volunteer assistance to the police and seminars of the PDEA in 
schools, financial assistance and health care for the barangay tanods (community volunteers ap-
pointed by the barangay council for assistance in the spheres of peace and security). In addition, 
Sara Duterte-Carpio decided to shift budgetary allocations towards social development “because 
the first duty of government is individual security and family enhancement” (Duterte S. 2010). 
With respect to citizen security, Sara Duterte’s stated objective was “to reduce crime every 
month until it is at a level at which people can no longer notice the crimes being committed” (quot-
ed in: Durianburg 2011). Clearly a hardliner, she also invented a complex system of cash incentives 
for the solution of various types of crime. The highest incentives were for murder with P15,000 (ap-
prox. 250€) for every five cases of murder, and 5,000 for every five rape or drug cases “solved and 
cleared.” That “solved and cleared” could not mean killing a suspect was pointedly driven home by 
her, when she ordered the relief of a police chief after a suspect was found dead under suspicious 
circumstances. She explained her action to then Davao City police director Ronald Dela Rosa: 
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I would like to remind you and the entire DCPO [Davao City Police Office; P.K.] that to allow 
murders similar to that […] to continue happening makes a mockery of your capacity to law-
fully protect and serve Davao City according to your sworn oath […]. I should emphasize to 
all DCPO personnel that there is no shortcut to good police work that builds a case against 
the suspect. (Durianburg 2012)
Sara Duterte-Carpio’s hardline stance always prioritizes security over all other potentially competing 
values. Thus, in the conflict between individual liberty and security, security is always given priority, 
as for example in the establishment of a city-based public safety and security command center and 
an anti-crime unit (DC-ACU) as well as the installation of hundreds of closed-circuit television cam-
eras (CCTV) in public areas. These and other measures have been widely commended in the local 
press as effective means for making Davao “a safe, secure city” (Edge Davao 2013a). The Tok-Hang 
operations conducted by the Davao City Police Office (DCPO) since 2013 were also fully supported 
by the local population. The campaign was said to have “resulted in the surrender of two dozen ‘drug 
personalities’ and the subsequent arrest of nearly 500 others in 2013” (quotes: Nawal/Fernandez 
2015). Overall, the local population was satisfied with the handling of peace and order by the DCPO 
(a 77% approval rate; Ateneo de Davao University 2014: 87). 
Sara Duterte-Carpio and her father’s paradigm of peace and order as the backbone for economic 
development was well received locally, especially as it was integrated into a fairly holistic program for 
social and economic advancement that included a host of progressive policies, for example, in the 
spheres of gender and environmental protection. No wonder that when Sara Duterte-Carpio stepped 
aside as mayor for her father in 2013, she received excellent ratings from the local business and bu-
reaucratic elite. Sara Duterte-Carpio is described in outstandingly positive terms in a way that also 
links social and economic development, on the one hand, and an iron-fisted anti-crime stance on the 
other, as two sides of the same coin (Edge Davao 2013b). 
4.3.3 loCal CItIzen SeCurIty durIng the duterte CampaIgn
Similar to the Gatchalian brothers and Lilia Piñeda, Mayor Sara Duterte-Carpio successfully upheld 
local LGU control and thus local ownership over local police strategy of crime control in the wake of 
her father’s procla¬mation of a PNP-led war on crime. Upon her return to the position of Davao City 
mayor in 2016 she issued a very simple overall political message: “I want our constituents to have 
gainful employment, decent housing, educated and healthy children, able to eat three meals a day, 
and to be safe and secured in their daily activities” (Davao today 2016a). With respect to the govern-
ment anti-drug campaign, she stated: “I assure you that the city government will always give priority 
to intervention programs and initiatives for the rehabilitation of the citizens who are using drugs” 
(Davao Today 2016b).
Unlike the other two LGUs discussed above, Davao City governance has been and still is disci-
plinarian, with a host of city ordinances that regulate and limit social life in various ways. Many of 
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these ordinances impinge directly on local citizen security, such as, for example, one requiring all 
businesses employing 10 or more persons to establish a drug-free workplace and accept regular 
mandatory drug testing of 10 percent of their workforce (City Ordinance No. 0506-13), a liquor ban 
that prohibits bars and other establishments from selling alcoholic beverages after 1:00 a.m., an 
anti-smoking ordinance that effectively bans public smoking, a curfew for minors aged 18 years and 
under from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m., an internet café ordinance that regulates minors’ access, and a noise 
ban effective from 9 ,p.m., to mention only a few. These are all strictly enforced by the police and the 
local government units, with the clear aim of disciplining the population, if necessary at the expense 
of individual liberties. 
More closely related to the core policy of crime control are a number of local programs that link 
police and auxiliary forces, such as, Oplan Iron City (launched in May 2017), which strengthens neigh-
borhood watch programs, Oplan Lambat Bitag, and Oplan Bulabog, which targets car theft, among 
others, or Oplan Iron Fortress, which is directed at strengthening community support and Davao City 
Shield 911 (mostly the creation of a motorcycle quick reaction team from November 2019 onwards). 
What emerges in the case of Davao City is an overall picture of a “big brother” version of govern-
ment based on an integrated, control-based system of crime prevention and control that aims at the 
disciplining of the whole citizenry. Without the presence of Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, actual practice 
has become less violent than might have been expected four years ago. Instead, under Sara Duter-
te-Carpio’s mayorship, the police seem to have shifted to a hardline strategy that nevertheless largely 
follows bureaucratic rules and laws and thus results in a reduction of police and especially vigilante 
use of deadly force. 
Davao City reacted strongest to the presidential campaign amongst the three cases with active 
chief executives. After a lull in 2017/18 police use of deadly force rose again in the following years to 
levels clearly higher than those of the other two LGUs. This fits the difference in strategies propagat-
ed by the three chief executives, with Sara Duterte-Carpio being clearly the most repression- and po-
lice-oriented amongst the three. Thus, while Davao City local ownership of security governance was 
equally capable of mitigating the dynamics of the central government campaign, the big-brotherly 
local style of security governance that is largely implemented via aggressive policing coincides with 
higher levels of civilian victimization. 
4.4 ACTIVE CHIEF EXECUTIVES, LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND RESILIENCE AGAINST EXTERNAL 
DEMANDS
Despite significant differences in the overall leadership personae of the three chief executives an-
alyzed above, the three cases demonstrate the effects of a common decision to make citizen se-
curity a core element of the chief executives’ political personae and leadership profile and a policy 
that establishes local citizen security as a joint LGU-PNP endeavor. Vertical loyalty of the local PNP 
branch has been complemented by strong hori¬zontal local bonds. The activation of these blunted 
the provision of a carte blanche by the president for the killing of crime suspects. All three chief ex-
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ecutives profited from their established legitimacy as active law-and-order politicians. This enabled 
the local police to avoid choosing sides in a potential conflict between LGU and a central administra-
tive authority and to stick to local practices without compromising ties to and good relations with the 
higher echelons of the police hierarchy or politics at the national level. In this context it was irrelevant 
that one of the three (Gatchalian) had been a core supporter of Duterte’s opponent Grace Poe in the 
contest for president and another one (Piñeda) had supported Liberal Party candidate Mar Roxas in 
the 2016 elections. These three LGUs show that local government was not the powerless victim of 
central directives but had realistic options for blunting the deadly dynamism. Variation in police use 
of deadly force levels during the latter Duterte years show that local ownership is no panacea against 
deadly police violence as such.
5. yIeldIng to the natIonal CampaIgn: four paSSIve ChIef 
exeCutIveS
This chapter focuses on four cases where police use of deadly force and vigilantism quickly spiraled 
out of control once Duterte took over as president. All four cases are close to Valenzuela and Bula-
can. While leadership personae of the respective chief executives differed, they share a fundamental 
disinterest in questions of citizen security, and left this to the local police. Similarly to the Gatchalian 
brothers and Lilia Piñeda, the chief executives of Bulacan, Quezon City, Manila and Caloocan backed 
the wrong horses in the 2016 presidential elections. However, other than the first-mentioned two, 
these four emphasized ingratiating themselves again with the presidential camp. To varying degrees 
all four signaled support for the President’s war on drugs. 
5.1 BULACAN PROVINCE – A DISINTERESTED LOCAL GOVERNMENT MEETS HARDLINE POLICE 
DIRECTORS
5.1.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng duterte preSIdenCy
Bulacan police’s use of deadly force was fairly high with 146 suspects killed during the decade from 
2006 to 2015, although, a full 34% (i.e., 50!) were killed within a period of one year only from October 
2014 to September 2015 (see Figure 8 in the online appendix), after which police killings reduced 
to close to zero for a few months. With growing prominence being given to Duterte’s election cam-
paign and his ideas about an all-out war on crime, police use of deadly force in Bulacan rose to 22 
killings during the five months from February to June 2016, thus returning to the high level of the 
previous peak. During the first year of the Duterte presidency Bulacan police killed 292 suspects 
(i.e., 24 per month). The second year from July 2017 to June 2018 saw 229 killings, the third 259, 
and the fourth from July 2019 to June 2020 159.7 Based on a population of approximately 3.3 mil-
7  Bulacan is the only province, where the provincial police itself provided a detailed and by all indications credible re-
porting system on all kinds of police operations from 2012 to the present, with a minor gap in 2018 and a larger one 
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lion, this is a staggering rate of close to 90 killings per million population during the first year of Dute-
rte and close to 50 during the fourth. This is all the more dramatic in view of the fact that police use of 
deadly force was only one pillar of repressive anti-crime violence during the first phase of the Duterte 
campaign. To this already outstanding rate, the vigilante killings of 94 suspects (7/2016–6/2017) 
must be added. Whereas during this period the rates of vigilante killings per million population were 
1.3 in Pampanga, 3.2 in Valenzuela and 3.0 in Davao City, it stood at 27.9 in Bulacan (see online ap-
pendix Figure 4). Whereas the first three cases signal that vigilantism could be controlled, Bulacan 
signals that it also could be given free rein.
In Bulacan, two hardline police officers had comparatively long terms in the top provincial posi-
tion, Romeo Caramat (4/2016–4/2018) and Chito Galves Bersaluna (5/2018–10/2019). The actual 
kill rate was almost identical for Bersaluna and his predecessor Caramat (22.1 and 21.3 suspects 
killed per month). It only fell somewhat during the terms of office of Bersaluna’s successors Emma 
Libunao (12/2019–1/2020; 14 killings per month) and Lawrence Cajipe (since 2/2020), who had an 
average of 10 killings per month until August, when the number went down to 4 and finally to 1 killing 
in September 2020. 
5.1.2 a paSSIve polItICal leaderShIp and hardlIne polICe dIreCtorS
Again, local politics, or more precisely the combination of political and police leadership play an im-
portant role in accounting for the statistics just cited. Neither before nor during Duterte’s anti-drug 
campaign did the Bulacan provincial leadership provide any leadership with respect to questions of 
peace and security. Instead it avoided this topic by leaving it to the local police directors. 
This proved fatal, as there was a succession of two hardline provincial police directors who aimed 
at reduc¬ing crime by all means, when the superordinate bureaucracy adopted this as policy. The 
hardline orientation of the first of these two, Romeo Caramat, was strengthened by the recognition 
given to him by then president-elect Rodrigo Duterte, who rewarded him and one of his subordinates 
“with P300,000.00 for their dedication in fighting the drug menace in their locality” (Manila Bulletin 
2016), in June 2016. This strengthened the police director’s vertical loyalty to the president’s an-
ti-crime stance, and simultaneously signaled the future presi¬dent’s expectations to local political 
executives.
Whereas in Valenzuela, Pampanga and Davao City, local governments took the lead in determin-
ing how to proceed in the campaign against drugs, this was left to the police in Bulacan province. 
The governor did not even provide a minimal level of security against police aggression for lower 
echelon local officials, such as, for example, when provincial police director Caramat threatened that 
non-cooperative barangay chairmen (village/ward leaders) might “run out of luck” and be killed by 
of six months in 2019. The following data derive from these PNP -reports (http://bulacanpnp.com/; currently only the 
2020 reports are still online) and on the author’s dataset for earlier years. For the gaps in the years 2018 and 2019 the 
PNP data have been replaced by ABS-CBN data. For a detailed presentation by month, year and police director since 
2012, see the online appendix in Figure 8. 
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unidentified assailants (Marshall/Chalmers 2016). The local government response remained decid-
edly weak. Governor Sy-Alvarado8 expressed criticism only once, in October 2016, when he called 
for action against the operators and financiers of the drug business and not against the users and 
small-scale pushers: “This is the only solution I can see to stop the killings in our beloved province” 
(Politiko South Luzon 2016). Yet, almost at the same time, police director Caramat clarified the local 
police strategy: “It will be bloody […] You have a problem with dengue. You think you can solve it with-
out killing mosquitos?” (Marshall/Chalmers 2016). 
This language provided the background to the vicious campaign – unopposed by local politicians 
– that dehumanized drug suspects, both users and pushers alike, in a way that strongly departed 
from the cognitive and normative framework for police use of deadly force in neighboring Pampanga 
and Valenzuela. The Bulacan chapter of the league of municipalities “expressed its 100 percent sup-
port,” perceiving the campaign only in the context of “intensified operations of the police” (Politiko 
Central Luzon 2017). Local politicians in Bulacan completely ignored the vast number of suspects 
killed in their province and only noted its positive effects on investments. The provincial governor’s 
comments on a provincial Peace and Order Council meeting have the same tenor. Sy-Alvarado com-
mended the Bulacan police: “While we are creating an atmosphere that is very conducive to business 
investors, the anti-crime offensive by our policemen has also created an atmosphere not conducive 
to criminals and lawless elements” (Gamos 2017).
The difference from the neighboring province of Pampanga is striking. Whereas in Pampanga 
drug addicts were perceived as fellow Kapampangans and therefore not as legitimate targets of 
police use of deadly force, the dominant perspective in Bulacan was completely different. When 32 
suspects were killed on a single day in August 2017, Jose de la Rama, Bulacan head of the Integrated 
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the national organization of lawyers (!), stated: 
It’s better to see 20 drug addicts dead than see 20 innocent women or children raped and 
killed (by drug addicts). […] “The policemen are just doing their job. […] The police must be 
serious in their drug operation in the province and the officers must be commended for 
doing their job. (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2017)
It is only consistent with such views that a few days later the municipal police director of Norzagaray 
was honored for “recording the most [sic] number of drug suspects killed during police operations […] 
from July 1 to Dec. 31, 2016” by provincial Governor Sy-Alvarado and police director Caramat (Inquirer 
2017). 
This local government reaction, a combination of neglect, indifference and support for hardline 
police operations did not come out of the blue when Duterte took office as president in 2016. As 
mentioned above, in earlier years crime control had been left up to the police and citizen security had 
been a political non-topic. The important link between police and local government units and com-
8  On the Sy-Alvarado family in Bulacan politics, see the online appendix: Sy-Alvarado.  
22 PETER KREUZER
munities that was prominent in the pronouncements of the Gatchalian brothers, Lilia Piñeda and even 
Sara Duterte-Carpio was completely absent in the case of Bulacan. This left security-related decision 
making exclusively a matter for the police. 
The potential consequences of this lack of interest by the LGU in the sphere of peace and secu-
rity and a tough PNP anti-crime approach had already become visible in 2014, when new incentives 
emerged from the national level for a tougher stance on crime with “Oplan Lambat Sibat” (Opera-
tion-Plan Net and Spear) pushed by then Secretary for the Interior and Local Government Mar Roxas. 
Unlike Pampanga and Valenzuela, the new focus on large-scale police operations had immediately 
been implemented in Bulacan under Police Direc¬tor Divina since late 2014 and resulted in a surge 
from 12 to 50 killings in one year. This pre-Duterte escalation of police violence drew neither praise 
nor blame from provincial politicians. It went completely unnoticed by both the political class and 
local media alike. With an indifferent provincial government, an absence of net-works bridging LGU 
and local PNP branches, as well as a center-oriented, hardline police leadership, core dimensions for 
a violence-prone war on drugs were in place in 2016. 
This was aggravated by the provincial government’s bad choice of whom to support politically 
in the 2016 elections. Shortly before the elections, Governor Sy-Alvarado, Vice-Governor Daniel Fer-
nando and a large number of mayors and other local officials quit their old party, the National Unity 
Party (NUP), which supported Duterte. They joined the Liberal Party, thus signaling their support for 
Duterte’s opponent for office, Mar Roxas. 
With the “One Bulacan Program for Rapid Industrialization” (PRIDE) the provincial government 
had been working on a host of projects aimed at establishing Bulacan as a premier industrial hub for 
the National Capital Region. Bulacan government was also eyeing extensions of its special economic 
zones, and actively wooing Chinese investors among others. A new international airport for the NCR 
was also in the pipeline. While good links to the national government had previously been important 
for approvals and financial support, they be¬came even more crucial under Duterte, on account of the 
latter’s “build-program” that promised vast numbers of infrastructure projects for Bulacan, such as, 
for example, railway projects that could link the province and its (future) airport to the center of Metro 
Manila. This need for clientelist access to the president and his entou¬rage was a further building 
block for provincial government ideological support for and non-interference in the police-driven exe-
cution of the national policy, as understood by a succession of hardline police directors. 
5.2 QUEZON CITY
For the past decades Quezon City (QC) has to a large extent been Belmonte land, even though the 
family teamed up with an actor, Herbert Bautista, for close to two decades. From 2010 to 2019 Bau-
tista was city mayor, encircled by Belmonte family members in various political positions. Josefina 
Belmonte, the three-term vice-mayor took over Bautista’s position in 2019. 
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In the run-up to the 2016 elections both mayor and vice-mayor figured prominently in the Liberal 
Party election campaign and thus not only backed the wrong horse, but, from the perspective of Dute-
rte, actually backed the worst horse. Vice-mayor Josefina Belmonte was the national chairperson of 
the “Leni [Robredo] for Vice-President Movement” and campaigned nationwide for the Liberal Party 
candidates. In addition, Josefina’s nephew Christopher “Kit” Belmonte, one of the family’s representa-
tives in the House of Represent¬atives (Quezon City 6th district) had just taken over as secretary gen-
eral of the Liberal Party and Josefina Belmonte’s father won his third and final term as Congressman 
(Quezon City 4th district). Put simply, the election victory of Duterte was a danger to both the political 
and the economic foundation (Philstar Media Group) of family power (for details of the Belmonte 
family’s political and economic basis, see the online appendix: Belmonte).
5.2.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng the duterte preSIdenCy
Before the 2016 elections, the problem of illegal drugs or the wider problem of crime control had not 
been a core interest of the Bautista/Belmonte government. While there were regular ordinances prop-
agating aware¬ness, nothing further happened after the establishment of a City Drug Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Center in 1993. The only news that linked the mayor to anti-illegal drug efforts occurred 
when he slapped a suspect, who had just been caught by the police on drug charges and had refused 
to answer the mayor’s questions in 2014 (GMAnews.online 2014). Despite the liberal leanings of the 
LGU top leadership, the high levels of police use of deadly violence in QC appears to never have both-
ered them, even though QC already had a notable record of police use of deadly force in the decade 
before Duterte (see Figure 1 above and Figure 2 in the online appendix). The 10-year average stood at 
14.3 killings per million population and year; in our sample surpassed only by Manila with 14.5. The 
2016 reaction to Duterte not only resulted in a police kill-rate of 71 for the first year, but also in an 
excessively high rate of vigilante killings (24.4 per million inhabitants; see online appendix Figure 4). 
5.2.2 a paSSIve polItICal leaderShIp appeaSIng duterte 
After the election victory of Rodrigo Duterte a first step to ingratiate the Belmonte family with the 
incoming administration was the support for the new president pledged by House speaker Feliciano 
Belmonte Jr. for the remnants of the Liberal Party, many of whose members of congress had already 
switched to either Duterte’s PDP-Laban or other parties allied with Duterte. 
Despite this move, Duterte made it clear that he was casting a critical eye on Quezon City. On his 
first day in office, a new police director, Guillermo Eleazar, was appointed to Quezon City and 32 of-
ficers were relieved of their duties and transferred to Mindanao (GMAnews.online 2016). Only a few 
days later, President Duterte singled out former Quezon City police director Edgardo Tinio as being 
involved in illegal drug trade. By August the number of dismissed QC police officers had further risen, 
with the new director Guillermo Eleazar arguing that the vast majority of them had been involved in 
illegal drugs (Politiko Metro Manila 2016a). 
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Mayor Herbert Bautista did his best to dissociate himself from the police, even asserting that 
up to 2016 the Quezon City Police District (QCPD) directors had always been appointed by the PNP 
without any consul¬tation with him. He also claimed that “it is imperative that the District Director is 
given full administrative and operational control over the QCPD’s rank and file,” even though legally 
the mayor is entitled to a strong say in this respect (Politiko Metro Manila 2016b). Around the same 
time, it became public that the brother of the mayor, City councilor Hero Bautista had tested positive 
to drugs. Simultaneously, the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), a nationwide NGO, 
filed a complaint with the ombudsman to investigate the Quezon City mayor and his brother over the 
drug situation in Quezon City (Bonquin 2016). 
Small wonder that the Quezon City government became almost invisible and mute on the topic for 
the next few months and left the initiative to new QC police director Eleazar, who pushed for a hard-
line policy. More than one year after the beginning of the campaign, in November 2017, QC Vice-May-
or Joy Belmonte meekly commented that the rash of killings in Quezon City was a 
complex problem […] Some of [the killings] were related to drugs. Some of them weren’t. 
Some of the others, I think, are just an excuse, and it’s really hard. So, I don’t want to be 
judgmental and say that these are just because of the President. (Evangelista, Gabuco & 
Garcia 2017)
Ignoring the vast number of killings in QC, the vice-mayor even claimed at a conference that QC’s 
approach was showing good results: “Data from the Quezon City Police District indicate that our col-
lective efforts have led to a considerable decrease in drug-related crimes in QC and the downgrading 
of our villages to lower levels of affectations” (Mateo 2017). A few weeks earlier, during a lull in the 
anti-illegal drugs campaign, when the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had taken over 
operational control and killings became less frequent, Quezon City barangay captains brought a res-
olution to the president, approved by QC city council and supported by then Acting Mayor Belmonte, 
asking for the PNP to be placed back in control of the campaign (Politiko Metro Manila 2017).
These moves signaled a complete turnaround of Liberal Party standard bearers. In 2019 mayoral 
candidate Joy Belmonte, who had already shifted party allegiance from Liberal to Duterte’s PDP-La-
ban in 2017, allied her own local Serbisyo sa Bayan Party with the Hugpong ng Pagbabago (HNP) of 
Duterte’s daughter Sara. Belmonte actually argued that she wanted Quezon City to be at the forefront 
of the changes promised by Duterte, and claimed: “What President Duterte and Mayor Sara have 
fought for is change for the good of our country, and I, as well as my fellow candidates from the city 
and the national candidates we support aim to deliver that” (Inquirer 2019).
This turnaround allowed Belmonte to become somewhat more active in devising a more broadly 
framed anti-drug crime policy aimed at regaining some control over the campaign in QC. She now 
stressed that a strengthening of the Barangay anti-drug abuse councils and enhanced cooperation 
GOVERNORS AND MAYORS IN THE PHILIPPINES 25
with volunteer informers and peer group organization was to be at the core of this policy.9 In addition, 
she took up a concept from Davao City that made employers responsible for a drug-free workplace 
through, among other things, random drug testing. She also established a comprehensive database 
managed by the newly activated City Anti-Drug Abuse Advisory Council on all admitted drug users 
in QC (Mateo 2019). Thus, in Quezon City the local chief execu¬tive is slowly moving in the direction 
of local ownership and bridging networks, suggesting a higher level of local resilience in any future 
external shock. 
5.3 MANILA 
5.3.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng the duterte preSIdenCy
At first sight, the case of Manila, unlike the cases of Bulacan, Quezon City or Caloocan, seems to be 
a paradox. Whereas pre-Duterte police use of deadly force levels had been quite stable, with minor 
fluctuations in the other LGUs, Manila City levels fluctuated strongly from very low levels in 2006 and 
2007, intermediate levels during the next three years and highly excessive levels in 2011 and 2012 (74 
killings in 2012) to a sudden drop in 2013 and a further drop to only five reported killings in 2015, few-
er than half the 11 suspects killed in Caloocan in the same year. Despite the huge temporal variation, 
the average annual kill rate in Manila was almost identical to the one in Quezon (both 14 killings per 
million inhabitants) for the decade from 2006 to 2015. This is more than four times the pre-Duterte 
average for Caloocan (3.1). Despite the outstanding drop of police killings in the years immediately 
preceding the Duterte presidency, Manila reacted most explosively to Duterte campaign, with a police 
kill rate almost twice as high as those of Quezon City and Caloocan. 
5.3.2 polItICal opportunISm of a ChIef exeCutIve
In Manila one initial question is why police use of deadly force dropped by such an unprecedented 
degree in the years after 2012. Put simply, this seems to have been because Joseph Estrada won the 
9  This shift was based on local experiences in Barangay Culiat, notorious in past years as a drug-infested no-go area 
for the police. Barangay Culiat and especially its Salam Compound are special with respect to a tightly knit Muslim 
minority population. It is important to note that the initiative for this shift did not lie with the QC government, but the 
QC police and dates back to 2017. At that time the QC police established their “QC Muslim Community Drug-Clearing 
Project” that in certain respects relied on “racial profiling,” as it targeted Muslim drug dealers and sought to make use 
of the local leaders of the tightly knit Muslim communities, “because they form a ‘solid group’” (Enano 2017). Police 
and local community representatives established a highly functional cooperative relationship that allowed for a min-
imization of killings. 
  As QC police director Guillermo Eleazar had already noted in 2017, the Salam Compound: “used to be very notorious 
and impenetrable. But because of their concern, the community worked together with the barangay and the police, 
and it was effective” (Enano 2017). As a local Muslim police commander remarked in 2019 on the very specific scope 
of this project: “We worked together, about seven tribes, Maguindanaoan, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan, Iranon, Sama 
Gangingi, and Balik-Islam. We formed a Peace and Order council, so we have been peaceful here for the last two 
years” (Panti 2019; translated by P.K.). Actually, it was traditional tribal social control that worked in this case. 
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2013 elections for mayor. He won against Alfredo Lim, former police general, ex-Secretary of the Inte-
rior and Local Government and ex-Senator. Alfredo Lim was famous or notorious as the “Dirty Harry” 
of the Philippines. Lim advocated and implemented an iron-fisted anti-crime strategy – a strategy 
that translated into a rash of killings during his second term in office. Joseph Estrada on the other 
hand was popular among the urban poor for his image as an outlaw and strongman based on his 
starring roles in numerous action movies from the 1960s to the 1980s. Often overlooked is that at 
no point during his long political career did the strongman image correspond to Estrada’s practice 
of governing, neither as mayor of San Juan City (1969–1986) nor later in various other positions, 
including his term as president (1998–2001). When he stood for mayor of Manila City in 2013 he 
campaigned on a promise to end the policy of his predecessor, who, as Estrada critically remarked 
“takes the law in his own hands” (Rodriguez 2013). Estrada clearly signaled a different approach link-
ing crime to poverty: “Hungry stomach […] knows no law” (Evangelista 2013). Yet, while he managed 
to put a cap on police killings in Manila, his rhetoric was not matched by other political action. While 
Estrada doled out rewards to police offic¬ers, he had no vision of any strategy for citizen security. 
The Manila City Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) was only created in June 2016 after the election 
of Rodrigo Duterte and the discovery of various drug labs in the city. This came on top of the problem 
that Estrada, as almost all other chief executives in the sample under investigation, had backed the 
wrong candidates in the national elections. Unlike the other local chief executives discussed above 
and below, Estrada had no support from a family network in governing Manila City. This made him 
overly reliant on vertical links to the national administration. Small wonder that Estrada aggressively 
followed the lead of the president, proclaiming: 
What our President (Rodrigo Duterte) is doing is right. Our country is already in danger. Let 
us all unite, and finish off these druggies […]. The police cannot (do this) on their own. The 
barangay chairs are needed. The barangay tanods. They know who the drug pushers and 
users are in each barangay […]. Rub them all out. Let’s finish them. (Mangunay 2016) 
Estrada very quickly succeeded in re-establishing a positive relationship with Duterte, as could be 
seen by his being invited to become godfather to Sara Duterte-Carpio’s third son in March 2017 and 
the presence of Rodrigo Duterte at Estrada’s 80th birthday party. Afterwards, police use of deadly 
force in Manila City dropped significantly. 
However, also in the following years the mayor gave no prominence to a city-based approach to 
citizen security, except for a small program dating from his time as vice-president (1992–1998) that 
provides for some drug education in schools (DARE program). Otherwise Estrada regularly repeated 
his pledge to make Manila City drug-free until he lost to Isko Moreno Domagoso in the 2019 election. 
After less than half a year in office, the latter pointed out that the Estrada administration had not al-
located any city funds to the anti-drug campaign at all during the previous three years (Edera 2019). 
Throughout his mayorship of Manila, Estrada acted as a political opportunist. When a strong 
stance against police violence suited his political aims in his contest against Alfredo Lim in 2013 
he positioned himself accordingly and managed to bring police violence down to extraordinarily low 
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levels. In 2016 he completely shifted his stance to remedy the negative effects of his prior decision 
to support Duterte’s political opponent. As soon as the new alignment had accomplished its purpose 
of securing the political link to the Duterte admin¬istration, violence patterns reverted to lower levels 
starting in mid-2017.
5.4 CALOOCAN 
5.4.1 fatal polICe vIolenCe before and durIng the duterte perIod
Police shoot-out levels in Caloocan were less than a quarter of those in neighboring Manila and 
Quezon City during the decade before Duterte and also slightly lower than those in Bulacan and 
Davao City. Despite this, police violence exploded during the first year with Duterte in Malacañang 
Palace. Even more noteworthy than the leap in police use of deadly force was the exceptional rate of 
vigilante killings. During the first year of Duterte, vigilante and unaccounted-for killings constituted 
a full 60% of the total documented cases in Caloocan. Among the earliest victims were several ba-
rangay officials (Palatino 2019). Most prominent was Barangay 188 chairman Edres Domato, “widely 
known as a drug lord” (Badilla 2016). This specific pattern lends credence to suggestions that many 
of these killings were aimed at hiding “the identities of the politicians and police officers involved 
in the illegal drug trade” (Galupo 2016). Whereas vigilante killings had already dropped dramatically 
during the second year, police killings fell more slowly, but were down to pre-Duterte levels by the 
second half of 2019, when Caloocan reported the lowest police killing rate compared to all other 
units under consideration. 
5.4.2 preemptIng the threat of beIng lInked to “narCo polItICIanS”
Caloocan Mayor Oscar Malapitan10 qualifies as a passive chief executive with respect to citizen 
security prior to the 2016 elections. In his case, passivity coincided with the public perception of 
Caloocan as a hotbed of drug crime in the National Capital Region and long-standing rumors that 
the mayor and family members and political allies had strong links to local druglords. The most 
serious allegations dated from 2012, when the police found nine kilos of crystal meth in a SUV 
“owned” by Malapitan’s running mate for vice-mayor, Antonio Almeda (Ramos 2012). In 2013 the 
United Movement Against Drugs targeted Almeda, the mayor, and his daughter, Sharon F. Bautista, 
then barangay captain in Caloocan City, as alleged “narco politicians” (Manila Times 2013). In 2013 
this posed no problem to the mayor and his allies, because the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agen-
cy (PDEA) stated that it would not investigate cases of politicians allegedly accepting drug money. 
The situation changed with the 2016 election campaign of Rodrigo Duterte, who repeatedly declared 
that he would order the PDEA and PNP to pursue “narco politicians.” With rising approval ratings 
10  On the political fortune of the Malapitans, see the online appendix: Malapitan.
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for presidential candidate Duterte, the mayor shifted towards an expressly hardline anti-drug abuse 
stance, arguing that 
for my second term, we will declare an all-out war against drug pushers and drug syndi-
cates, put up a rehabilitation center for drug victims, and institute a reward system for 
informants. We will strengthen the Caloocan Anti-Drug Abuse Council to initiate proactive 
projects in all schools. (Agoncillo 2016a)
As soon as Duterte had won the election, Malapitan became a prominent supporter of the presi-
dent-elect’s policy line. During the preceding years the city government’s so-called “anti-drug cam-
paign” had no specified funding and consisted of no more than a few educational and sports activ-
ities. Malapitan already declared an “all-out” war against drug crime several weeks before Duterte 
took office as president. He offered a bounty to the public and the police for tips and for the arrest 
of criminals. He also ordered local barangay captains to provide him with lists of drug personalities, 
threatened criminals that they might end up dead if they resisted arrest, and declared a curfew for 
minors effective from July 2016 onwards (ABS-CBN News 2016). The mayor now wanted to “hunt 
and crack down on everyone who is associated with drugs. We will not stop until we completely di-
minish drugs in Caloocan” (Agoncillo 2016b). He seems to have acted out of concern that he might 
be targeted as a “narco politician.” This can at least be deduced from a comment made by Caloocan 
police director Bartolome Bustamante: “If the head will speak, others will follow. Before, policemen 
are apprehensive to go after anti-drug law violators; now we know we have a backup” (Agoncillo 
2016b). 
5.5 THE DEADLY EFFECTS OF PASSIVE AND OPPORTUNISTIC CHIEF EXECUTIVES 
The chief executives of Bulacan, Manila, Caloocan and Quezon City represent variations on a com-
mon theme. None of them gave emphasis to questions of citizen security or crime control before 
the 2016 election campaign. Local civilian institutions under the direct or indirect control of the city 
governments dealing with citizen security remained weak. Networks offering a bridge between LGU 
and local PNP for establishing mutual trust were not established. In all four cases the chief execu-
tives bet on the wrong horse in the 2016 elections. Even worse, in two of the cases, the chief exec-
utives were directly or indirectly linked to illegal drug trade and consumption. Both faced the risk of 
being named in any official or unofficial list of “narco-politicians” at the president’s pleasure and run 
the risk of being killed by vigilantes. 
Lacking a secure network of interacting local agents of crime control encompassing the local 
police, all four local chief executives decided on a rather similar course: to let the police run the 
show. Two of them, Malapitan and Estrada, went further and followed the political lead of the an-
ti-drug campaign in their baili¬wicks. Bulacan’s Sy-Alvarado and Quezon’s Bautista and Belmonte, all 
without prior displays of strong¬manship, chose to evade the issue and give free rein to their police 
directors.
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6. ConCluSIon
While the results of the above analysis are still preliminary, they indicate that it is worthwhile to bring 
a strong focus on politics back into research on police use of (deadly) force. The focus on the sub-
national level of politics further refocuses attention in a field of research that tends to seek explana-
tions for problematic police behavior within the institution itself. 
When politics come into play, it is normally at the national level, at exceptional times, such as, 
for example, when national leaders from Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines to Thaksin Shinawatra 
in Thailand and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil call for a war on crime, a ManoDura (iron fist) or Mano Su-
perdura as in El Salvador under presidents Francisco Flores and Antonio Saca. Media and scholarly 
debate often create the impression of a fairly uniform pattern of fatal (and non-fatal) police use of 
force in specific countries, but in fact this need not be the case. Local variation among subnational 
political units is high in countries with a long-standing practice of excessive fatal police violence, 
such as the United States or Brazil. It is also high in countries with campaign-style excesses, such 
as Thailand and the Philippines. The preliminary results provided in this report suggest that detailed 
analyses of spatial (and temporal) variation of police (and other forms of repressive) violence and 
their relationship to local politics may provide some important insight for minimizing the occurrence 
of such violence. 
In the above exploratory analysis of a small number of Philippine LGUs, the focus was on the 
political personae of chief political executives at the level of province and independent city. This is 
due to the fact that in the Philippines not only are politics always local, but they are also centered on 
families and individual political leaders, who normally build their power from the bottom up, and it is 
individuals or individual representatives of locally trusted families and not parties who are elected, 
from the lowest level of barangay to the highest office in the land. 
The present analysis has shown that politicians differ with respect to the salience of citizen secu-
rity in their thinking and of their position on strategies of crime control. The present sample suggests 
that during periods without crisis, crime control tends to be higher on the agenda of political hardlin-
ers, for whom it is a fitting part of their political profile, whereas for all others it is more a political bur-
den that does not promise any political returns and is thus better left to the police. In times of crisis, 
as, for example, when an active national chief executive takes over and demands an iron-fisted war 
on crime, this seems to result in a paradox: Whereas former hardliners dampen police and vigilante 
violence, the others either actively support the crackdown on the drug trade or at least tolerate the 
excessive violence perpetrated by police and vigilantes. 
Thus, we find executives who actively localize crime control during “normal” times, enmeshing 
the local branch of the PNP into horizontal networks with local governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. Such behavior may be described as typical of local government bent on subverting 
top-down central control of the local branch of a national bureaucracy and is generally associated 
with clientelism, corruption, sub-optimal performance and state weakness. However, in the context 
analyzed here, it functioned as a moderating device. Thus, a second paradox emerges: Local political 
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leaders who had been fairly successful in localizing or sub¬verting top-down control of crime-control 
policy were not only able but willing to redirect local police practice and proved capable of containing 
violence dynamics emanating from the national center. 
A final paradox is that active and passive chief executives do not differ in any systematic way with 
respect to their personalist conception of politics or their populist presentation of their policies. Mod-
ernist representatives of an efficiency-focused policy orientation like the Gatchalian brothers, tradi-
tional caring patrons like Lilia Piñeda, standard bearers of liberalism like the Belmontes, strong(wo)
men like Sara Duterte-Carpio and traditional politicians like Oscar Malapitan or Joseph Estrada share 
the same fundamental understanding of politics as a personal or family affair. Expressed in simple 
terms, in the arena of Philippine politics there is no alternative to the highly personalized politics of 
the past or present. To a significant extent Philippine politics is a rule of individuals and not of law 
or bureaucratic regulations, an important characteristic which constrains strategies for preempt¬ing 
future excesses of police or other state/elite-linked repressive violence. 
Personalism and familism are not only dominant because there are no alternatives on the supply 
side of politics. They prevail because these patterns of ordering the social and political world fit the 
role expectation of political leadership held by the vast majority of Filipinos and Filipinas (Kreuzer 
2020). A politician who does not meet this expectation will lose at the polls. Therefore, reform ef-
forts aiming at strengthening state institutions, political parties and the rule of law are bound to fail, 
if only because they would run squarely counter to the demand-side for patronage and personalistic 
structuring of an integrated politico-economic sphere. Further, recipes that focus on security sector 
reform are clearly insufficient, as the problem and its potential solutions are primarily situated in the 
political realm. 
A key lesson can be drawn from the comparison of passive and active mayors and governors. If 
active local security governance during normal times provides an option for counteracting repressive 
national level initiatives, liberal politicians should not avoid this politically otherwise unrewarding 
issue of citizen security and leave it to the law enforcement agencies in non-crisis times. Instead, 
they should make security governance a regular and important part of their political agenda. Security 
governance may be an inconvenient issue for local politicians. However, leaving it to hardliners in 
“normal times” undermines liberal claims that there are superior alternatives to the iron fist. In coun-
tries with high levels of crime, support for an iron-fisted anti-crime strategy will only collapse, if liberal 
politicians establish an alternative policy that succeeds in providing „law-and-order“ without the use 
of extralegal means. 
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GOVERNORS AND MAYORS IN THE 
PHILIPPINES.      
RESISTANCE TO OR SUPPORT FOR 
DUTERTE’S DEADLY WAR ON DRUGS
Rodrigo Duterte has become infamous for his war on drugs in the 
Philippines that cost the lives of thousands of Filipinos. However, 
killings were far from uniformly spread across the country. Other-
wise comparable local government units even reacted in funda-
mentally different ways to the “license-to-kill” granted to the police 
and vigilantes by the President.
Peter Kreuzer shows that local government makes a big differ-
ence. Local governments with leaders who had made public safety 
a key component of their political agenda even before Duterte took 
office used established practices and good contacts with the lo-
cal police to neutralize central government directives. By contrast, 
heads of government who had left the politically unprofitable issue 
of public security to the police tolerated or supported the escala-
tory dynamics emanating from the political center. How these dy-
namics developed in practice is illustrated by an analysis of seven 
local government units.
Dr. Peter Kreuzer is a senior researcher in PRIF’s research depart-
ment “Intrastate Conflict.” In his research he focuses on Philippine 
domestic politics, violence in multiethnic societies, and maritime 
conflicts in East and Southeast Asia.
